It is just that reality per se is transcendent to human interest. Such a transcendent realm lies beyond the limits of language, and as such cannot be spoken of. Speaking of that which cannot be spoken of is metaphysical chatter: a chatter that, as it were, bumps against the limits of language. Consigning the transcendent to silence is called for. While Wittgenstein affirms there is that which is transcendent, such is, for him, better left unspoken.
Grammar delineates object-referents PI , p. Grammar is an inherent property of language. And language is an activity borne of the human form of life. Considering that Wittgenstein speaks of language as part of human natural history, one is tempted to think of human biological nature.plicsoftgeaddinglin.tk/rudi-2-una-quietud-inquietante-rudi.php
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Humans, by evolutionary happenstance, became what they are: animals with a large brain, extremely complex nervous system, highly flexible vocal chords, dexterous upper limbs, and so on. Obviously, human physiological characteristics are among the necessary conditions to doing, or to learning to do, certain activities, such as conceptualizing and articulating.
All these are among the enablers that humans need in order to use, or to learn to use, words. It is a biological endowment that a human being is at all capable of acquiring capabilities such as, or especially, complex linguistic capability. This capability includes polysyllabic vocalisation, gesticulation, emotion, symbolization, ratiocination, and so on. To be able to do all these, one must have certain physical equipments that only nature provides.
Words are a product of biology. Birds chirp and dogs bark as a matter of course to communicate. Birds and dogs just are being what they are when they respectively chirp and bark. Similarly, when humans use words, they are just being what they are. Just as chirps and barks are respectively to the avian and the canine ways of living, words are to the human way of living PG, p.
In that sense, then, words, just like chirps and barks, are a product of biology. Concept formation has a biological background Z , Language-games regarding virtually all things are characterized both by natural human capabilities and inabilities Z , , One can imagine that had humans evolved to be slightly different than what they actually are, they would be having a form of life slightly but significantly different from what they currently have PI , p. Had humans evolved differently, they would have formed a different conception of the world. One can imagine the difference it would make had the organic human form of life evolved differently.
If one imagines that only human nature, and not the rest of nature, differs from what it currently is, then one can arrive at the position that humans will have, for example, a different colour system, and even different human perception of the world in the area of colours Z , I understand that the orthodox position is to examine the thought and not the man, but I think the contra position is worth pursueing. Maybe we could go for a freudian reading, where he had repressed metaphysical leanings Freud again.
What does our thought about Freud's thought on this have to do with philosophy? Wrong terminology. And I don't even like freud. It's reprinted in a book "Protosoziologie im Kontext". Here are my impressions: The author makes the familiar points that Wittgenstein was trying to move past "Platonistic" theories of meaning and also wanted to downgrade traditional epistemology. Johannes Johannes 5 5 silver badges 12 12 bronze badges.
The way your source puts it, is very misleading. Long explanation by Carnap himself The whole point is clearly stated by Carnap in his paper on the " Elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language " , esp. Or, as Gottfried Gabriel once put it: With Carnap, so to speak, Frege's Begriffsschrift lies on the desk and Nietzsche's Zarathustra on the bedside table. I'm sure that they didn't have any problem with metaphysical poetry or books - so long as they know their place.
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The intent of the question isn't to discuss metaphysical poetry in the aesthetic art or political realm rhetoric which is exactly where Carnap puts it, but to simply to show something that Wittgenstein understood but the Positivists didn't - that there is weight to metaphysics, that it has Being. Carnap is for the surgical "elimination of metaphysics" by the positive examination of language, he asserts that all metaphysical claims are "meaningless, [and] we intend this word in its strictest sense.
In this sense the source is NOT mischaracterising Wittgenstein and is consistent with Badious conception of him as a mystic. Mozibur: My claim is that the "source" mischaracterizes Carnap. I said nothing about Wittgenstein, as far as I can see. The source article is right insofar as most logical empiricists rejected Wittgenstein's seeming appreciation for a deeper truth lying in that "whereof one cannot speak".
Yet I would reply that "meaninglessness" in Carnap doesn't amount to "incommunicability" or something like that, as is the case with Wittgenstein. Carnap simply has a much wider conception of language than the early Wittgenstein, in which different forms and purposes of language are equally recognized. Mozibur: Also, re: "so long as they know their place".
This one is ambiguous: One thing is to sharply distinguish different domains 1 , the other is to draw some conclusions about how these domains are valued 2. I give you 1 and drawing this divide is IMO the problematic part , but you and the source article seem to imply that Carnap valued other domains of life less than the scientific one, and I don't see any prima facie evidence for that.
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That's my worry. Mozibur: Indeed, I think the opposite is the case. The dualism in Carnap is that between Geist Intellect and Leben Life , which he inherited from Lebensphilosophie and there's good evidence that Carnap saw Leben and not Geist!
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
The big difference wrt to Wittgenstein is that, even when Carnap associates Leben with irrationality, he always does so within a secularist framework , which prevents him from adopting mystical views about the non-rational domain of Leben. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus : 6. This shows itself; it is the mystical.
Brommage So if Wittgenstein pointedly rebuffs the positivists of the Vienna Circle, its because they tried to claim him as one of their own having entirely misunderstood him. Finally, Badiou discusses Wittgenstein in his Anti-Philosophy and he characterises him as: "[the] mystic, the aesthete, the Stalinist of spirituality". Sign up or log in Sign up using Google. Sign up using Facebook. Sign up using Email and Password.
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And this is undoubtedly the case. They evolved, not for the sake of science and its objectives, but rather in order to cater to the interacting contingencies of our nature, our culture, our environment, our communicative needs and our other purposes.
As a consequence the commitments defining individual concepts are rarely simple or determinate, and differ dramatically from one concept to another. Moreover, it is not possible as it is within empirical domains to accommodate superficial complexity by means of simple principles at a more basic e. Reactions to this impasse have included a variety of theoretical proposals.
Some philosophers have been led to deny that there is such a thing as absolute truth. Some have maintained insisting on one of the above definitions that although truth exists, it lacks certain features that are ordinarily attributed to it — for example, that the truth may sometimes be impossible to discover. Some have inferred that truth is intrinsically paradoxical and essentially incomprehensible. And others persist in the attempt to devise a definition that will fit all the intuitive data. Instead we should begin, he thinks, by recognizing as mentioned above that our various concepts play very different roles in our cognitive economy and correspondingly are governed by defining principles of very different kinds.
Thus possession of the concept of truth appears to consist in an appreciation of that triviality, rather than a mastery of any explicit definition. The traditional search for such an account or for some other form of reductive analysis was a wild-goose chase, a pseudo-problem. Truth emerges as exceptionally unprofound and as exceptionally unmysterious. Philosophical problems typically arise from the clash between the inevitably idiosyncratic features of special-purpose concepts — true, good, object, person, now, necessary — and the scientistically driven insistence upon uniformity.
Related Wittgensteins Metaphysics
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